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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action involving a dispute of ownership 
to a strip of land approximately 70 feet by 969 feet located 
between the Plaintiffs' property on the west and Defendants' 
property to the east. The Plaintiffs claim that their pre-
decessors in title acquired ownership of the disputed strip 
of land through boundary line by acquiescence establishing an 
"old fence" line which had defined the boundary between the 
properties for more than forty-five (45) years as the boun-
dary line; and that said predecessors then conveyed ownership 
to Plaintiffs through deeds which have legally transferred 
title to Plaintiffs. The Defendants claim that their title 
is based upon surveys and deeds from their predecessors. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The Trial Court 
entered judgment qu~eting title to the disputed strip to the 
Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs could not have relied 
upon the "old fence" as their boundary line because they were 
charged with actual or constrictive notice of the recorded 
boundary line of MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION when they 
purchased. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and to 
have judgment entered in their favor as a matter of law, or 
that failing, the granting of a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves a dispute as to the ownership 
of a strip of land 70 feet by 969 feet, shown on the plat 
hereafter as Parcel (1): 
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Plat of Property 
BRANDON PARK SUBDI~ IS ION 
Albert Dean w. o. Nelson McDonald Brothers 
Parcel ( 3) Parcel ( 4) Parcel ( 5) 
..J ~ .. _Old Fence _ .. ... .. .. 
... t 
, #' 









'"' *' ~ 
Me ado· 'rl Cov~~ Subc ivisi< ~n No. 2 
(Rey1 ~old ~ ohnso1 L) 
Jr>arceJ ( 2 ) 
The Plaintiffs are owners of lots in MEADOW COVE NO. 2 
SUBDIVISION, PARCEL (2) on the plat. MEADOW COVE SUBDIVISION 
was developed by PORTER BROTHERS in 1973 and, upon the advice 
of their surveyor, BUSH & GUDGELL [Record, p.12], PORTER BRO-
THERS accepted the east property line of the subdivision to 
be approximately seventy ( 70) feet west of the "old fence" 
) 
which they had thought to be· the east property line when they 
purchased the property [Record, p.188, 189], even though the 
subdivision plat does not agree with Johnson's deed descrip-
tion [Record, p.295]. Until PORTER BROTHERS developed MEADOW 
COVE SUBDIVISION in 1973, all the property shown as Parcels 
(1), {2), (3), (4), and (5), were open fields, divided by the 
"old fence" [Record, p. 214, 215] • 
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The "old fence" was built prior to 1925 when ALBERT 
DEAN moved on to Parcel ( 3} [Record, p. 20 5] , and when ALBERT 
DEAN purchased Parcel ( 3} in approximately 1935, he was in-
formed that the "old fence" was the west boundary of his 
property [Record, p.206]. During the time he owned it, he 
farmed west to the "old fence" [Record, p.199] which was un-
derstood to be the boundary line. Upon selling the property 
to SOFFES in approximately 1965 [Exhibit, P-16], DEAN inform-
,, .. ~.. ''11 
ed the SOFFES that they were buying property to the "old 
fence" [Record, p.201]. 
By Stipulation, it was shown that W. O. NELSON, the 
owner of Parcel (4), occupied, used, and farmed the land west 
to the "old fence" understanding the "old fence" to be the 
\ 
west boundary line of their property [Record, p.314, 315] for 
a period from 1947 through 1967. 
McDONALD BROTHERS acquired Parcel (5) in 1955 
[Record, p.319] by a deed which specifically limits the 
warranty deed [Exhibit P-20] :to "That part of the above 
property situated within the present existing fence 
lines •.. ". Until May of 1978 [Deed Exhibit P-21], McDONALDS 
occupied, farmed, or used the property west to the "old 
fence" [Record, p.320]. 
On the west side of the "old fence", REYNOLD JOHN-
SON purchased the property in 1943 [Exhibit D-5]. He testi-
fied that he was told that he was acquiring everything east 
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to the "old fence" [being all of parcels (1) and (2)] (Re-
cord, p.212]. During the entire time JOHNSON owned the pro-
perty, he occupied, used, and farmed the property east to the 
"old fence" [Record, p.213], using the ditch which parallels 
the "old fence" to irrigate his crops [Record, p.214]. 
REYNOLD JOHNSON deeded to SOUTH MOUNTAIN LAND 
COMPANY in 1971 [Exhibit P-14], telling the buyer they were 
buying to the "old fence" on the east [Record, p.217]. JOHN-
SON at no time had the property surveyed, neither when he 
purchased it nor when he sold it [Record, p.222], but relied 
solely on the location of the fences to define the boundary. 
No evidence to the contrary was introduced by 
Defendants. The uncontroverted evidence shows that, for a 
period covering at least forty-six (46) years from 1925, when 
ALBERT DEAN testified the "old fence" to be the boundary be-
tween these properties and all adjoining owners, on both 
sides of the fence, acquiesced in the fence line as the boun-
dary line [Record, p. 205], until 1971 when BUSH & GUDGELL 
platted MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION, in spite of the dis-
crepancies in the deeds [Record, p.293-295] as defined by the 
engineer, GEORGE APOSHIAN, and affirmed by Defendants' engi-
neer, CLARENCE BUSH [Record, p.402]. 
The surveyors agreed that the deeds on both sides / 
of the "old fence" failed to close and had errors in the des-
criptions [Record, p.293, 380, 402]. On the east side of the 
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old fence, both surveyors, Plaintiffs' and Defendants', agre-
ed that the description for Parcel ( 3) over laps into MEADOW 
COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION by twenty-six (26) feet [Record, 
p.381, 382]. The description on Parcel ( 4) came with two 
different descriptions [Record 385, 386], and, if they were 
to use the main description (another description was in 
parenthesis) there was again a sixty-eight (68) foot gap 
[Record, p.386] which is the width of the disputed strip, and 
would have complied closely to the "old fence" 
Regarding Parcel (5), the McDONALD tract, Defen-
dants' counsel admitted that Defendants had a problem there 
[Record, p.391], and Defendants' own surveyor testified that 
the legal description under which the Defendants obtain Par-
eel (5) only goes to the "old fence" [Record p.391, 395] and 
does not go to the 40-acre line (white fence); yet the Trial 
Court has quieted title for Defendants to the seventy ( 70) 
feet west of the "old fence" without any evidence or legal 
basis for the claim, confirmed by the 1962 deed to McDONALD 
BROTHERS, their predecessor, which provided: 
Granters only warrant that part of the 
above described property situated within the 
present existing fence lines now located upon 
the property, and as located by an official 
survey of the property made by Bush & Gudgell 
Engineers, 263 South 2nd East Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and granters do not warrant title of the 
above property situated outside of the fence 
lines. [Exhibit P-20] 
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thus confirming that the "old fence" was confirmed as the 
boundary line between these properties as per the Quit Claim 
Deeds from JOHNSON and PORTER BROTHERS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE 
ISSUE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
In the Amended Pre-Trial Order, it was ordered that 
the issues to be decided were as follows: 
a. The Plaintiffs' claim title to the 
disputed property, hased upon the doctrine of boun-
dary line by acquiescence. [Record, p.56] 
The Plaintiffs claiming that boundary line by ac-
quiescence had vested ownership in Plaintiffs' predessor in 
interest, and that the interest of the prior owners has been 
conveyed to the Plaintiffs heretofore by proper deeds. 
[Record, p.56] 
b. Defendants claim title to the dis-
puted property on the basis of surveys made by BUSH 
& GUDGELL ENGINEERS, Salt Lake City, Utah, based 
upon descriptions contained in applicable deeds. 
(Emphasis added) [Record, p.57] 
And the Court ordered that the above order "Shall 
supercede the pleadings herein, and shall govern the trial of 
this action." [Record, p.57] 
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Contrary to the Pre-Trial Order, an examination of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shows that the 
issue of boundary by acquiescence was ignored, and the Court 
erroneously made findings which infer that Plaintiffs were 
claiming to have gained title to the disputed strip of land 
through their purchase of lots in MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDI-
VISION [Findings of Fact, Nos. 2,3,4,5,6,7; Record, p.66]; 
also, Conclusions of Law, Nos. 1 and 2; Record, p.68]. 
The parties stipulated during trial [Record, p.249, 
250] that the Plaintiffs were relying upon their ownership to 
the disputed strip solely through the Quit Claim Deeds from 
REYNOLD JOHNSON [P-15] and PORTER BROTHERS [Exhibit D-9], 
through which it is alleged the boundary line by acquiescence 
was established. 
The Court so agreed that the entire case should 
stand or fall on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs' pre-
decessors in interest acquired ownership of the disputed 
j 
strip of land [Record, p.242, lines 3-9 and lines 23-24]. 
After three days of receiving evidence concerning 
the boundary by acquiescence issue, the Court erroneously 
failed to rule on the issue of whether or not Plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest gained ownership of the disputed 
strip through boundary by acquiescence, in violation of the 
Amended Pre-Trial Order, and the overwhelming burden of the 
evidence. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 9 
The courts have made clear that, where the Pre-
Trial order purports to state the issues to be tried, the 
trial should be confined to such issues, and other issues 
should be eliminated from consideration. The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 16, provides: 
The court sh al 1 make an order which 
recites t · action taken at the conference, the 
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agree-
ments made by the parties as to any of the matters 
considered, and which 1 imi ts the issues for trial 
to those not disposed of by admissions or agree-
ments of counsel; and such order when entered 
controls the subsequent course of the action, un-
less modified at the trial to prevent manifest in-
justice. The Court in its discretion may establish 
by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may 
be placed be placed for consideration as above 
provided. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the Pre-Trial Order was stipulated to by both 
parties without objection. This policy is stated also in 62 
AM JUR, Pre-Trial Conference, §34, p.666: 
.•• the court may and should exclude evidence in 
support of other issues; ... no findings of fact can 
be made upon other issues •.• 
See also KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL SALES v. LORDS, 460 P.2d 
321, 23 U.2d 152 (1969); 22 ALR 2d, 599, 603 §2. 
In opposition to the Court's Amended Pre-Trial 
Order, no findings were made on the issue of boundary by 
acquiescence, and Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2, and Con-
clusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 [Record, p.66] base the denial 
of Plaintiff's claim upon Plaintiff's notice of the specific 
boundaries of MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION when, in fact, 
) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~e 10 
Plaintiff's claim of title has nothing to do with their pur-
chase of lots in MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION, but relies on 
the title of their predecessors gained through boundary by 
acquiescence [Record, p.250]. The Court's Findings and Con-
clusions are erroneous and in violation of the amended Pre-
Tr ial Order. 
II. THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE ACCRUED TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST 
The legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has 
been recognized in Utah and clearly defined. In an article 
in the UTAH LAW REVIEW, Volume 1975, Spring, No. 1 at page 
224, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and the Utah 
cases defining the same were reviewed and discussed. This 
Court has made clear that a boundary established by acquies-
cence is binding not only on the acquiescing owners, but also 
on their grantees [JOHNSON v. SESSIONS, 25 U.2d 133, 477, 
P. 2d 788 ( 1970)] , and it may not be changed by renewing an 
old dispute [PROVONSHA v. PITMAN, 6 U. 2d 26, 305 P. 2d 486 
(1957)]. 
In the landmark case of FUOCO v. WILLIAMS, 15 U.2d 
156, 389 P.2d 143 {1964), this Court defined the elements for 
establishing boundary by acquiesce, stating: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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[l] This court over a period of years 
has formulated four elements which must be shown by 
the person claiming title by acquiescence in order 
to raise the presumption that a binding agreement 
exists settling a dispute or uncertain boundary. 
These elements are: (1) occupation up to a visible 
line marked definitely by monuments, fences or 
buildings and ( 2) acquiescence in the line as the 
boundary ( 3) for a long period of years ( 4) by 
adjoining land owners. 
The evidence introduced during the trial in this 
matter showed, without any rebutting evidence: Element (1) 
the occupation of the property on both sides of the "old 
fence" with the owners using and farming their respective 
land up to the "old fence"~ Element (2) that the owners un-
derstood that the legal descriptions were defective, but ac-
cepted and acquiesced in the "old fence" as the boundary 
line. 
With each owner having understood the "old fence" 
to be the boundary between the properties [Record 198, p.211, 
314] and one owner, McDONALD BROTHERS [Parcel (5)], even had 
notice in thei)r deed [Exhibit P-20] that the warranty deed 
did not warrant title to anything outside the fences located 
by BUSH & GUDGELL, and CLARENCE BUSH then testified that the 
McDONALD deed went to the "old fence" [Record, p. 395] 
Element ( 3) that the acquescence was for a long 
period of time at least covering from 1925 when ALBERT DEAN 
moved to Parcel ( 3) [Record, p. 204] testifying that the "old 
fence" was in place at that time [Record, p.198]. And with 
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each of the principal owners on both sides of the fence ac-
knowledging this fence to be the boundary without question or 
contrary evidence until in 1973, when BUSH & GUDGELL surveyed 
for PORTER BROTHERS, and decided to locate the east property 
line of MEADOW COVER NO. 2 SUBDIVISION approximately seventy 
(70) feet west of the "old fence". Accordingly, the boundary 
fence had been recognized and acquiesced as the "old fence" 
for at least forty-eight (48) years; and Element (4) the ac-
quiescence was evidenced by all the adjoining landowners, 
REYNOLD JOHNSON [Parcels ( 1) and ( 2)] , ALBERT DEAN [Parcel 
(3)], w. o. NELSON [Parcel (4)], and by the actual deed of 
McDONALD BROTHERS [Parcel ( 5)] • Thus all four elements of 
boundary by acquiescence were established. 
Not one witness was introduced by the Defendats to 
refute the existence of the four elements of boundary by ac-
quiescence,· although this Court has ruled in KING v. FRONK, 
14 U.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963), that if these four elements 
exist, then it is incumbent upon him who assails the title by 
acquiescence to show by competent evidence that a boundary 
was not thus established. 
This Court has made clear that the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence applies, even though the adjoining 
owners could not show that the acquiescing parties had ever 
agreed on the boundary's location. Once the elements of the 
doctrine are established, the Court presumes that the par-
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ties, at some earlier time, had entered into an express ag-
reement to establish the line. FUOCO v. WILLIAMS, supra.; 
NUNLEY v. WALKER, 13 U.2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); HUMMEL v. 
YOUNG, 1 U.2d 237, 265 P.2d 410 (1953); ELSBERG v. BATES, 121 
Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951); BROWN v. MILLINER, 120 Utah 
16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). 
This Court has further made clear that a fence 
still may be recognized as a boundary line even though the 
fence is old, the wires down, and the posts rotted away. 
JOHNSON REAL ESTATE CO. v. NIELSON, 10 U.2d 380, 353 P.2d 918 
(1960). In the present case, the fence was old and sometimes 
testified to be in poor repair, but remained as a clearly 
definable fence line, even to the time of trial [Record, 
p.280] and in addition, is paralleled by an irrigation ditc~ 
which runs along the west side of the "old fence" [Record, 
p.207' 213]. 
Accordingly, all four elements of boundary line by 
I 
acquiescence were shown to exist, without a single i te.~a of 
iebutting evidence; and yet the trial court failed to make a 
finding or judgment regarding this, the Plaintiffs' only is-
sue of boundary by acquiescence, and should be required to 
enter judgment in accordance with the Pre-Trial Order to de-
cide whether the line was established by acquiescence. 
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III. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAVING OCCURRED, 
OWNERSHIP HAS NOW PASSED TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the boundary 
line of the "old fence" was established by acquiescing owners 
many years prior to the time BUSH & GUDGELL ENGINEERS in 
1973, first decided to establish the east line of MEADOW COVE 
NO. 2 SUBDIVISION. This Court, in the case of PROVONSHA v. 
JOHNSON, 6 U. 2d 26, 305 P. 2d 486 ( 1956) , dealt with a boun-
dary dispute, such as the instant case, which arose after the 
fence had been in place for some 35 or more years. The 
Court held as p.29: 
If by that time a boundary by acquie-
scence had been established, as we think it had, 
under principles heretofore announced by this 
court, succeeding grantees could not marshal! their 
disagreements or misunderstandin~s to destroy that 
established boundary. 
Again the uncontested evidence shows that from at 
least 1925 until 1973, the "old fence" was established as the 
boundary line by acquiescence. The owner who occupied, farm-
ed, and used the disputed strip at the time the boundary line 
was established, was REYNOLD JOHNSON, who in 19 4 3 purchased 
the land without survey and defined by his predecessor to go 
east to the "old fence" [Record, p.211]. 
Having established the bundary line, JOHNSON became 
the owner of the disputed strip of land. When JOHNSON deeded 
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the 1 and to (BUCHANAN) SOUTH MOUNTAIN LAND CO. , in 19 71 
[Exhibit P-14], the legal description he used did not des-
er ibe the disputed strip. Therefore, the ownership of the 
disputed strip either remained with JOHNSON, or it passed to 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN LAND CO., and then to PORTER BROTHERS, the de-
velopers of MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION. If ownership re-
mained with JOHNSON, JOHNSON then conveyed it to Plaintiffs 
by his quit claim Deed [Exhibit P-15]. If ownership of the 
disputed strip passed to PORTER BROTHERS, by virtue of the 
series of deeds, it still is now vested in the Plaintiffs be-
cause PORTER BROTHERS also deeded Quit Claim to the Plain-
tiffs [Exhibit D-9]. 
Therefore, if boundary by acquiescence occurred, 
and there is no contrary evidence, the act ions of BUSH & 
GUDGELL, or the Defendants, cannot alter the already es-
tablished boundary line, the "old fence" and the trial 
court's ruling, without any contrary evidence, would allow a 
.I 
trial court to terminate the effect of the doctrine of boun-
dary by acquiescence in Utah. The trial court should be 
required to rule on the issue of boundary by acquiescence. 
IV. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
In order for the trial court to quiet title to the 
disputed strip of land, Defendants must introduce evidence of 
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a legal claim to the disputed strip. The Defendants purchas-
ed their property in three pieces, shown heretofore on the 
plat as Parcels (3), (4), and (5). The description contained 
in Defendants' deeds show that Parcel (3) overlaps into MEA-
DOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION by twenty-six (26) feet, which 
does include that portion of the disputed strip [Record, 
p.382]. 
The Defendants' description for Parcel (4) con-
tained two descriptions. The primary set of distances left 
the west boundary line sixty-eight ( 68) feet short of the 
MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION, being almost identical to the 
"old fence" line [Record, p.386]. Only by using a secondary 
set of distances which were in parentheses [Record p.386, 
lines 7-11] could the surveyor get the description to comply 
with the "40-acre line" or rear of MEADOW COVER NO. 2 SUBDI-
VISION [Record, p.386, lines 1-11]. 
However, on Parcel ( 5) , the McDONALD tr act, the 
Defendants' · attorney admitted Defendants have problem with 
that piece [Record, 391, lines 8-9 and 17-20]. Further, De-
fendants' engineer, CLARENCE BUSH, testified that the deed 
by which the Defendants acquired Parcel ( 5) [Exhibit D-27] 
fits the "old fence" and does not include the disputed stip 
to the 40-acre (or MEADOW COVE NO. 2 SUBDIVISION) line 
[Record p.395]. 
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No evidence was introduced by the Defendants to 
show any legal claim that Parcel ( 5) extended west of the 
"old fence" to include that portion of the disputed strip. 
Yet the trial court granted a quiet title judgment to De-
fendants the entire disputed strip of land, without requiring 
Defendants to show any evidence of ownership of that portion 
of the property. Even if the court had found that the boun-
·t 
dary line had not been established by acquiescence, the judg-
ment was in error because Defendants showed no evidence of 
title to the South. 
Accordingly, the Defendants failed to sustain their 
burd~n. This-Court.has ruled that in quiet title actions, a 
party must prevail on the strength of their own title. MI-
CHAEL v. SALT LAKE INVESTMENT CO., 345 P.2d 200, 9 U.'2d 370 
( 1959); MERCUR COALITION MINING v. CANNON 112 Utah 13, 184 
P. 2d 341 ( 194 7); HOMEOWNERS LOAN CORPORATION v. DUDLEY, 105 
Utah 108, 141 P.2d 160 (1943). Even if the Plaintiffs had 
failed to prove boundary by acquiescence, the Defe1dants were 
not entitled to a quiet title judgment without showing title 
to the entire strip. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court's judgment should be reversed, 
and judgment entered for the Plaintiffs; or, in the alterna-
tive, a new trial ordered. 
DATED this J? 1fi day of March, 1980. 
WALKER & HINTZE, INC. 
By t.~/cJL. 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I?"! day of March, 
1980, a true and correct copy of the forego in Appellants' 
Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mr. Steven H. Stewart 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents 
220 South Second East Street, No. 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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